

DAVID THORSTAD

Last updated October 9, 2026

CONTACT INFORMATION	Vanderbilt University 2301 Vanderbilt Place Nashville, TN 37240-6319	Email: david.thorstad@vanderbilt.edu Website: www.dthorstad.com
EMPLOYMENT	Vanderbilt University Assistant Professor of Philosophy	August 2023-
	Global Priorities Institute, Oxford Postdoctoral Research Fellow	July 2020-August 2023
	Kellogg College, Oxford Junior Research Fellow (Nonstipendiary)	October 2020-August 2023
EDUCATION	Harvard University , PhD in Philosophy	May 2020
	Haverford College , BA in Philosophy and Mathematics	May 2012
	Global Priorities Institute, Oxford , Visiting Fellow	Summer 2019
	Australian National University , Visiting Student	Summers 2017, 2018
	London School of Economics , Visiting Student	Academic Year 2017-18
	Pembroke College, Oxford , Visiting Student	Academic Year 2010-11
AFFILIATIONS	Vanderbilt Lab for Immersive AI Translation Fellow	December 2024-
	MINT Lab, Australian National University Research Associate	April 2024-
	Global Priorities Institute, Oxford Senior Research Associate	August 2023-July 2025
VISITING	Institute for Ethics in AI , University of Oxford Visiting Fellow	May-July 2026
	Center for Philosophy of Science , University of Pittsburgh, Visiting Fellow	January-April 2026
MONOGRAPH	<i>Inquiry under bounds</i> , Oxford University Press (2024). Reviews: <i>Mind</i> , <i>Philosophical Review</i> . Symposia: <i>Philosophical Studies</i> , <i>Syndicate Philosophy</i> .	
EDITED VOLUME	<i>Essays on longtermism</i> (w/Jacob Barrett and Hilary Greaves), Oxford University Press (2025).	
ARTICLES	Cognitive bias benchmarks should incorporate insights from ecological rationality , forthcoming in <i>Proceedings of NeurIPS</i> ('26). Attention and evidence , forthcoming in <i>Philosophy and Phenomenological Research</i> .	

Instrumental convergence and power-seeking, forthcoming in *Philosophical Studies*.

Procedurally rational framing effects, forthcoming in *Philosophers' Imprint*.

Satisficing, maximizing and bounded rationality, forthcoming in *Philosophical Quarterly*.

Cognitive bias in large language models: A vindictory approach, forthcoming in *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*.

Inquiry, (w/Arianna Falbo and Dennis Whitcomb), forthcoming in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

Précis of *Inquiry under bounds*, forthcoming in *Philosophical Studies*.

Reply to commentators, forthcoming in *Philosophical Studies*.

Exploitative informing, forthcoming in *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*.

Ecological rationality without externalism, *Philosophy of Science* 93.3 (2026): 561-85.

The scope of longtermism, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 104.2 (2026): 399-420.

The zetetic turn and the procedural turn, *Journal of Philosophy* 122.9 (2025): 483-507.

General-purpose institutional decisionmaking heuristics, *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 76.4 (2025): 1037-58.

The complexity-coherence tradeoff in cognition, *Mind* 134.534 (2025): 422-57.

Against the singularity hypothesis, *Philosophical Studies* 182 (2025): 1627-51.

Mistakes in the moral mathematics of existential risk, *Ethics* 135.1 (2024): 122-50.

The accuracy-coherence tradeoff in cognition, *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 75.3 (2024): 695-715.

Why bounded rationality (in epistemology)?, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 108 (2024): 396-413.

Against the newer evidentialists, *Philosophical Studies* 180 (2023): 3511-32.

Norms of inquiry, *Philosophical Topics* 51.2 (2023): 135-60.

High risk, low reward: A challenge to the astronomical value of existential risk mitigation, *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 51.4 (2023): 373-412.

There are no epistemic norms of inquiry, *Synthese* 200, 410 (2022).

Two paradoxes of bounded rationality, *Philosophers' Imprint* 22.15 (2022).

Tough enough? Robust satisficing as a decision norm for long-term policy analysis (w/Andreas Mogensen), *Synthese* 200 (2022): 1-26.

Inquiry and the epistemic, *Philosophical Studies* 178.9 (2021): 2913-28.

Permissive metaepistemology, *Mind* 128.511 (2019): 907-26.

SHORTER PIECES

Altruism and normative bargaining, *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 49 (2026): e156.

Replies to Peláez, Quanbeck and Shipley, *Syndicate Philosophy* (2026), <https://syndicate.network/symposia/philosophy/inquiry-under-bounds/>.

Exploitative informing: Can you exploit someone by giving them relevant information?, *BJPS Short Reads* (2024).

Review of *Idealization in epistemology* by Dan Greco, *Mind* fzae026, <https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzae026>.

Institutional decision-making heuristics: What lies beyond simple rules?, *BJPS Short Reads* (2024).

Accuracy and coherence: Can bounded agents have both?, *BJPS Short Reads* (2022).

FELLOWSHIPS AND GRANTS

Liverpool-Vanderbilt Joint Research Seed Grant (\$15,113) 2025-6
(w/Robin McKenna), Vanderbilt University and University of Liverpool.

Survival and Flourishing Fund (\$10,000) 2026
S-Process Grant (w/Sven Neth).

Greg S. Allen Dean's Faculty Fellowship (\$30,000) 2025-7
Vanderbilt University.

Institute for Ethics in AI (full support), University of Oxford 2026
Visiting Fellowship.

Center for Philosophy of Science (\$10,000), University of Pittsburgh 2026
Visiting Fellowship.

Mercatus Center (\$750), Conference travel funding. 2026

Dean's Research Studio (\$5,000), Vanderbilt 2025
Conference Grant.

Survival and Flourishing Fund (\$38,000), S-Process Grant. 2024

Robert Penn Warren Center for the Humanities (50% buyout) 2024-5
Vanderbilt Faculty Fellowship.

	Effective Altruism Infrastructure Fund (\$24,460) Grant to support a summer diversity program.	2023
	Center for Effective Altruism (£20,000) Event Support Grant (with Bridget Williams).	2023
	John Fell Fund (£10,000), University of Oxford Grant to support a workshop on inquiry.	2022
	Center for Effective Altruism (\$40,000) Event Support Grant (with Charlotte Siegmann).	2022
	PPE Society (\$250) Travel Grant.	2022
	Provostial Fund for the Arts and Humanities (\$4,000) Harvard University, Conference Organization Grant (with Branden Fitelson and Ned Hall).	2020
	Dissertation Completion Fellowship (\$32,000) Harvard University.	2019-2020
	GSC Travel Grant (\$750), Harvard University.	2019
	Frank Knox Memorial Traveling Fellowship (\$25,000) Harvard University.	2017-18
	GSAS Predissertation Summer Fellowship (\$6,000) Harvard University.	2015
	Magill-Rhoades Scholarship (full need), Haverford College.	2008-12
AWARDS / HONORS (ACADEMIC)	Francis Bowen Prize , Harvard University. Recognizes the best essay on a subject in moral or political philosophy.	2020
	Bechtel Prize , Harvard University. Recognizes the best essay on a philosophical topic.	2019
	Summa Cum Laude , Haverford College.	2012
	Phi Beta Kappa (as junior), Haverford College.	2011
	Collection Prizes (all subjects), Pembroke College, Oxford.	2010-11
AWARDS / HONORS (TEACHING)	Special Commendation for Extraordinary Teaching in Extraordinary Times , Harvard University.	2020
	Derek C Bok Award for Excellence in Graduate Student Teaching , Harvard University. Harvard's highest graduate teaching award. 5 awarded annually university-wide.	2019
	Certificates of Distinction and Excellence in Teaching (x6) , Harvard University:	2016-19

Virtue	Spring 2019
Social epistemology	Fall 2018
Saints, heretics, and atheists	Spring 2017
Fundamentals of logic	Fall 2016
Frege, Russell, and the early Wittgenstein	Fall 2016
Logic and philosophy	Spring 2016

TALKS

(†) Refereed

Tempering inference to the best explanation

<i>Inference to the Best Explanation Workshop</i> , University of Alabama	September 2026
<i>Center for Philosophy of Science</i> , Fellows' Working Group University of Pittsburgh	March 2026

Level separation in epistemology

University of Tennessee, Knoxville	February 2026
<i>Normativity and Reasoning Workshop</i> , NYU Abu Dhabi	January 2026
<i>Southeastern Epistemology Conference</i> , Flagler College	October 2025
† <i>St. Louis Annual Conference on Reasons and Rationality</i>	May 2025

Revisiting the shutdown problem

<i>16th Oxford Workshop on Global Priorities Research</i>	June 2026
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Procedurally rational framing effects

<i>PPE Society Conference</i> , New Orleans	(November 2026)
<i>Center for Philosophy of Science</i> , University of Pittsburgh	February 2026

“Instrumental convergence and power seeking”

<i>Interdisciplinary AI Network</i>	June 2026
<i>Institute for Ethics in AI</i> , University of Oxford	June 2026
University of Pittsburgh, Seminar, <i>AI: Risk, alignment, obsolescence</i>	February 2026
<i>AI and Humanity Lab</i> , University of Hong Kong	September 2025
<i>Hong Kong Catastrophic Risk Center</i> , Lingnan University	February 2025
† <i>Central APA</i> , PPE Society Session	February 2025
† <i>15th Oxford Workshop on Global Priorities Research</i>	December 2024
† <i>PPE Society Conference</i> , New Orleans	November 2024
<i>Global Priorities Institute</i> , Oxford	November 2024

Inquiry under bounds

<i>Rationality Seminar</i> , Purdue University	September 2025
<i>Inquiry Reading Group</i> , University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign	July 2025

Ecological rationality without externalism

<i>Mind and Cognition Group</i> , Purdue University	September 2025
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Symposium on *Inquiry under bounds*

American Philosophical Association
Central Division Meeting

February 2025

“Humility, ability and group inquiry: A counsel of moderation”

Humility in Inquiry Integration Workshop, Denver

February 2025

“Beyond longtermism”

Global Priorities Institute, Oxford

November 2024

“Cognitive bias in large language models: Cautious optimism meets anti-Panglossian meliorism”

PPE Society Conference, New Orleans

(November 2026)

UC Irvine, Center for Theoretical Behavioral Sciences

October 2024

† *Third International Conference on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence*, University of the Azores

September 2024

MINT Lab, ANU

August 2024

“Exploitative informing”

UC Irvine, Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science

October 2024

† *Axiology Workshop*, McGill University

October 2024

“The zetetic turn and the procedural turn”

Inquiry Workshop, Brown University

April 2024

Southeast Graduate Philosophy Conference (Keynote),
University of Florida

April 2024

Workshop on the Nature and Normativity of Inquiry,
University of Pavia

January 2024

Southeastern Epistemology Conference,
Spartanburg, South Carolina

October 2023

† *Duke-UNC Epistemology Workshop*

September 2023

† *Australasian Association of Philosophy Annual Conference*

July 2022

Workshop on Norms of Inquiry, Complutense University
of Madrid

June 2022

University of Zürich

May 2022

Groupe de Recherche Interuniversitaire Sur la Normativité
(GRIN), Montreal

March 2022

Cologne Center for Contemporary Epistemology and the Kantian Tradition (CONCEPT), University of Cologne

January 2022

Ideal and Non-Ideal Epistemology Seminar Series

December 2021

(Organized by Robin McKenna and Michael Hannon)

“The complexity-coherence tradeoff in cognition”

Australasian Association of Philosophy Online Conference

October 2024

Berkeley Bounded Rationality Conference

May 2024

† *Formal Epistemology Workshop*, Boston

June 2023

Formal Methods Group, King’s College, London

May 2023

“Against the singularity hypothesis”

<i>LIVE Learning Seminar Series</i> , Vanderbilt	October 2026
<i>Interdisciplinary AI Network</i> , Virtual	June 2026
<i>AI and the Human Seminar</i> , Vanderbilt	April 2025
<i>Ethics of Increasing AI Capacities</i> , Hannover	August 2024
<i>International Society for Utilitarian Studies Conference</i> University College, London	June 2024
<i>Colloquium on Artificial Intelligence and Catastrophic Risk</i> Australian National University	March 2024

“Mistakes in the moral mathematics of existential risk”

<i>Pitt-CMU longtermism reading group</i> , CMU	April 2026
<i>Moral philosophy working group</i> , Yale	April 2024
<i>Mimir Institute for Long-Term Future Studies</i> , Stockholm	December 2023
<i>7th PPE Society Conference</i> , New Orleans	November 2023
<i>Global Priorities Institute / LSE Joint Workshop</i> , London	May 2023
<i>Workshop on Pluralisms in Existential Risk Studies</i> , Oxford	May 2023

“Why bounded rationality (in epistemology)?”

<i>7th PPE Society Conference</i> , New Orleans	November 2023
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“Norms of inquiry”

† <i>Central APA</i> , Chicago, Illinois	February 2022
<i>Workshop on Inquiry</i> , Southern Normativity Group	September 2021
<i>Aarhus University</i> , Aarhus	May 2021
† <i>Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology</i> <i>Annual Meeting</i> , Louisville, Kentucky	December 2020
<i>Workshop on Bounded Rationality</i> , Harvard	October 2019

“Three paradoxes of bounded rationality”

† <i>Between Formal and Informal Methods in</i> <i>Philosophy</i> , Warsaw	September 2021
<i>Group for Analytic Metaphysics and Epistemology</i> Texas A&M	July 2020
† <i>British Society for the Philosophy of Science</i> <i>Conference</i> , Kent	July 2020

“There are no epistemic norms of inquiry”

<i>Episteme group</i> , University of Cambridge	March 2023
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“High risk, low reward: A challenge to the astronomical value of existential risk mitigation”

<i>Seminar on Longtermism</i> , Princeton	October 2025
<i>Ethics of Human Extinction Reading Group</i>	June 2024
† <i>Philadelphia Normativity Conference</i> , UPenn	October 2023
† <i>International Society for Utilitarian Studies 2023</i> , Rome	July 2023

† <i>Ethics After Parfit</i> , LMU Munich	January 2023
† <i>6th PPE Society Conference</i> , New Orleans	November 2022
† <i>Formal Philosophy 2022</i> , Moscow (Hybrid)	October 2022
<i>Tenth Oxford Workshop on Global Priorities Research</i>	June 2022
<i>Center for Population-Level Bioethics</i> , Rutgers	April 2022
<i>Ninth Oxford Workshop on Global Priorities Research</i>	March 2022
“General-purpose institutional decisionmaking heuristics: The case of decisionmaking under deep uncertainty”	
<i>17th International Congress on Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science and Technology</i> , Buenos Aires	July 2023
“The scope of longtermism”	
<i>Legal Priorities Project</i> , Harvard	February 2022
<i>Seventh Oxford Workshop on Global Priorities Research</i>	June 2021
“Inquiry and the epistemic”	
<i>Oxford Epistemology Group</i> , Oxford	November 2020
<i>Inquiry Network</i> , Online	November 2020
“The dual deontic role of unpossessed evidence”	
† <i>Great Lakes Philosophy Conference</i> Siena Heights University	April 2021
“Satisficing reclaimed”	
† <i>PLM Network Conference</i> , St. Andrews	August 2019
<i>Bounded Rationality Reading Group</i> , Oxford	July 2019
“Heuristics and longtermism”	
<i>Second Oxford Workshop on Global Priorities Research</i> , Oxford	July 2019
<i>Global Priorities Institute</i> , Oxford	June 2019
<i>Future of Humanity Institute</i> , Oxford	June 2019
“Pure time-preference: some error-theoretic remarks”	
<i>Workshop on Longtermism</i> , Oxford	March 2019
“Omission bias revisited”	
† <i>Australasian Association of Philosophy / New Zealand Association of Philosophy Annual Conference</i> , University of Wellington, NZ	July 2018
<i>ANU Modeling Ethical Theories Reading Group</i> Australian National University	July 2018
“Inquiry under bounds”	
<i>LSE Work in Progress Group</i> , London School of Economics	February 2018
“Permissive metaepistemology”	

<i>ANU Epistemology Reading Group,</i> Australian National University	June 2018
† <i>Yale Graduate Philosophy Conference,</i> Yale	April 2017
† <i>UT-Austin Graduate Philosophy Conference,</i> UT-Austin	April 2017
† <i>Northwestern/Notre Dame Graduate Epistemology Conference,</i> Notre Dame	April 2017
† <i>BARSEA Epistemology Workshop,</i> Cambridge University	February 2017
† <i>UConn Graduate Philosophy Conference,</i> University of Connecticut Storrs	November 2016

PUBLIC TALKS “Against the singularity hypothesis”

Apart Research	February 2025
EAGxVirtual	November 2024

“Mistakes in the moral mathematics of existential risk”

Effective Altruism Tübingen	July 2024
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“Against the singularity hypothesis”

AI safety reading group	June 2024
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“Existential risk pessimism and the time of perils”

ERA Fellowship, Cambridge	August 2023
EAGxCambridge	March 2023
EAGxSingapore	September 2022
EAGxOxford	March 2022

“Challenges to effective altruism”

Tarbell Fellowship Program, Oxford	March 2023
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TEACHING

At Vanderbilt University

Introduction to philosophy	(Fall 2026)
Epistemology (graduate seminar)	Spring 2025
Logic	Fall 2024
Ethics of AI	Spring 2024
Introduction to philosophy of AI	Spring 2024
Introduction to philosophy	Fall 2023
Inquiry (graduate seminar)	Fall 2023

As primary instructor at Harvard University

Rationality	Spring 2020
Virtue	Spring 2019
Social epistemology	Fall 2018
Introduction to logic (Harvard Summer School)	Summers 2018, 2019

As teaching fellow at Harvard University

Saints, heretics, and atheists	Spring 2017
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Fundamentals of logic	Fall 2016
Frege, Russell, and the early Wittgenstein	Fall 2016
Logic and philosophy	Spring 2016

As grader at Harvard University

Topics in logic	Spring 2017
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Supervision, etc.

PhD committee member: Ismail Kurun (Vanderbilt, in progress), Cameron Pattison (Vanderbilt, in progress).

External dissertation committee member, Dario Vaccro (UT-Knoxville, in progress).

External PhD examiner, Leonardo Flamini (Zurich/Pavia, 2024).

Advisor, Global Priorities Institute Early Career Conference Program.

Thomas Rowe (2021), Paul Forrester (2022), Leah Pierson (2021 and 2023), Tena Thau (2023).

Advisor, Oxford UNIQ+ Graduate Access Program, Elsie Lidington (2023).

Fellowship supervisor, Vanderbilt Lab for Immersive AI Translation (VALIANT), Cameron Pattison (2024-), Sun Jung Han (2025-)

Honors thesis supervisor Rovier Chen (2027), Abbe Knutsson (2027), Royce Yang (2027), Thomas Edman (2025).

Honors thesis second reader: Pax Poggi (2025), Joshua Uterstaedt (2025).

Other teaching

Harvard edX, Content developer	2018-2020
Harvard Precollege Passport Program, Instructor	2019
Lawrence International High School, Mathematics teacher	2012-13

PROFESSIONAL SERVICE Conferences organized

<i>Workshop on non-ideal theory</i> (with Sven Neth), Vanderbilt University	(2026)
<i>Sociotechnical AI safety for generative AI</i> (with Robin McKenna), University of Liverpool	2026
<i>Workshop on Beyond longtermism,</i> Vanderbilt University	2026
<i>Explanation</i> (with Ted Poston), Vanderbilt University	2025
<i>Inquiry Network workshops</i>	
<i>Fourth Inquiry Network workshop,</i> Rhodes College (with Jared Millson)	(2027)
<i>Third Inquiry Network workshop,</i> Toronto Metropolitan University (with Arianna Falbo (lead organizer) and Dennis Whitcomb)	2026
<i>Second Inquiry Network workshop,</i> Rhodes College (with Jared Millson)	2025
<i>First Inquiry Network workshop,</i> Vanderbilt University	2024
<i>Southeastern epistemology conference,</i> Vanderbilt University	2024

<i>Bayesianism and its rivals</i> (with Branden Fitelson, Will Fleisher and Ned Hall), Harvard	2022
<i>Oxford workshops on global priorities research</i>	
<i>Twelfth Oxford workshop on global priorities research</i> (with Loren Fryxell)	2023
<i>Eleventh Oxford workshop on global priorities research</i> (with Loren Fryxell)	2022
<i>Tenth Oxford workshop on global priorities research</i> (with Loren Fryxell)	2022
<i>Ninth Oxford workshop on global priorities research</i> (with Loren Fryxell)	2022
<i>Eighth Oxford workshop on global priorities research</i> (with Loren Fryxell)	2021
<i>Seventh Oxford workshop on global priorities research</i> (with Loren Fryxell, Rossa O’Keeffe-O’Donovan, and Benjamin Tereick)	2021
<i>Sixth Oxford workshop on global priorities research</i>	2021
<i>Fifth Oxford workshop on global priorities research</i> (with Andreas Mogensen and Rossa O’Keeffe-O’Donovan)	2020
<i>Workshop on bounded rationality</i> (with Branden Fitelson and Ned Hall), Harvard	2019
<i>Harvard-MIT graduate philosophy conference</i> (with Kevin Dorst, Jen Nguyen, and Max Siegel), Harvard	2015

Panels organized

<i>AI: Challenges in design and automation</i> (with Harry Lloyd) PPE Society Conference	(2026)
<i>Optimal altruism: Present, past and future</i> (with Harry Lloyd) PPE Society Conference	(2026)
<i>The moral and political implications of human extinction</i> Central APA, PPE Society Affiliated Session	2025
<i>Longtermism 1</i> (with Emma Curran), PPE Society Conference	2024
<i>Longtermism 2</i> (with Emma Curran), PPE Society Conference	2024
<i>Non-ideal theory</i> , PPE Society Conference	2023
<i>Ethics and the far future</i> , PPE Society Conference	2023
<i>Inquiry</i> , Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology	2020

Reading groups organized

<i>Critiques of effective altruism</i> (with Jacob Barrett) Global Priorities Institute, Oxford	2023
<i>The scope of longtermism</i> (with Hilary Greaves and Christian Tarsney), Global Priorities Institute, Oxford	2021
<i>Social justice and longtermism</i> (with Christian Tarsney), Global Priorities Institute, Oxford	2020
<i>Bounded rationality reading group</i> (with Sven Neth), Global Priorities Institute, Oxford	2019

<i>Epistemology reading group</i> (Four sessions. Unit on epistemic permissivism), ANU	2018
<i>Formal philosophy reading group</i> , Harvard	2016
<i>Accuracy-first reading group</i> , Harvard	2016
<i>Ethics and mathematics reading group</i> (with Zeynep Soysal), Harvard	2013-14

Program Committee and similar

<i>NeurIPS 2026</i> , Area Chair, Position Paper Track	2026
<i>Social ontology and empirical inquiry conflicts and connections</i> , Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh Program Committee	2026
<i>18th annual conference on artificial general intelligence</i> Program Committee	2025

Other organizing

<i>Inquiry Network</i> , Founder and co-organizer (w/Dennis Whitcomb and Arianna Falbo)	2020-
<i>Second Open Student Workshop on Global Priorities Research</i> (w/Bridget Williams), for members of traditionally underrepresented groups in global priorities research	2023
<i>First Open Student Workshop on Global Priorities Research</i> (w/Charlotte Siegmann)	2022
<i>GPI + WANBAM (Women and Non-Binary Altruism</i> <i>Mentorship) workshop</i> (w/Charlotte Siegmann)	2021

University and departmental service

<i>AI Committee</i> , Vanderbilt College of Arts and Sciences	2026-7
<i>Graduate admissions committee</i> , Vanderbilt Philosophy Department	2026-7
<i>Search committee</i> , Philosophy of Mind (senior)	2024-2025
<i>Steering committee</i> , Vanderbilt Grand Challenge on AI	2024-2025
<i>Colloquium committee</i> , Vanderbilt Philosophy Department	2024-2025
<i>Secretary</i> , Vanderbilt Philosophy Department	2023-
<i>Diversity initiative Chair</i> , Global Priorities Institute	2021-2023
<i>College advisor</i> , Kellogg College	2020-2023

Journal Refereeing (* denotes multiple): *AI & Society*, **Analysis*, **Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, **Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, *Dialectica*, **Episteme*, *Ergo*, **Erkenntnis*, *Ethics*, *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*, *Journal of Ethics*, **Journal of Philosophy*, *Journal of Social Philosophy*, **Mind*, **Noûs*, *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, *Philosophy Compass*, **Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, *Philosophical Review*, *Philosophy of Science*, **Philosophical Studies*, *Philosophical Topics*, *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science*, **Synthese*, *Utilitas*.

Other Refereeing: (* denotes multiple, † denotes program committee or similar): *†18th Annual AGI Conference, Austrian Science Fund, Bloomsbury Publishing, Cambridge University Press, *Formal Epistemology Workshop, †NeurIPS, *Open Philanthropy, Oxford University Press, Rethink Priorities, *Routledge, Schmidt Sciences, Simon Institute for Longterm Governance, Southwestern Philosophical Society, *Swiss National Science Foundation, Tennessee Philosophical Association, University of Chicago Press.

REFERENCES

Ned Hall

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Susanna Siegel

Edgar Pierce Professor of Philosophy, Harvard University
ssiegel@fas.harvard.edu

Warren Goldfarb (Teaching Reference)

Walter Beverly Pearson Professor of Modern Mathematics and Mathematical Logic, Harvard University
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