Bounded rationality is process-focused. Resource bounds constrain not only the beliefs we can form and the actions we can take, but also the processes of inquiry by which these beliefs and actions can be arrived at. For this reason, the bounded tradition focuses on norms governing inquiry rather than belief and action.

Philosophical work on inquiry spans at least two topics. Many authors tackle both at once.


Metaphysics of inquiry: What type of process is inquiry? Recent authors have argued that inquiry is directed at a question rather than a proposition, and that inquiry is intimately related to a class of interrogative attitudes such as curiosity, doubt and suspension of judgment.

Norms of inquiry: What are the norms governing inquiry? Recent authors have stressed that inquiry is governed by a number of norms that are importantly different from, and perhaps in tension with traditional epistemic requirements.


My research focuses on norms of inquiry. I defend a consequentialist account of rational inquiry and use that account to explain and defend key normative insights from the bounded tradition.

Non-philosophers have some cool things to say about inquiry too:

"Strategy selection as rational metareasoning", Falk Lieder and Thomas Griffiths

"From substantive to procedural rationality", Herbert Simon

"Heuristic decision making", Gerd Gigerenzer and Wolfgang Gaissmaier